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Globalisation has stalled, and may be in retreat. Despite the ongoing financial crisis, trade war, and pandemic, many observers still assert 
that the United States, the West, and China’s unique 
economic interdependence will continue to prop up 
some frayed globalisation. Perhaps so, but we cannot 
overlook the politics driving ‘decoupling’ in the United 
States and ‘self-reliance’ in China. Both ideas have 
their governmental protagonists, and both threaten to 
undermine globalisation even further. 
Although the United States is currently convulsed by 
division and unrest ahead of the 2020 presidential 
election, we mostly understand how the US systems 
of government and business work. We also think we 
know where America’s interests lie, even if the Trump 
administration pushes these assumptions to their 
limit. In China’s case, however, little of this is well 
understood. When Xi Jinping champions globalisation, 
what, exactly, does he mean? And what do Chinese 
leaders mean when they refer to self-reliance? Is it 
autarky, or a new form of globalisation with Chinese 
characteristics, as President Xi might say?
 
Now, in the wake 
of the pandemic, 
supply chains—
the plumbing of 
globalisation—are 
increasingly in 
the cross-hairs
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Globalisation on the wane 
Before the financial crisis, world trade grew at twice 
the rate of global GDP for three decades. Since, 
however, it has, on average, grown only in line with it. 
The volume of merchandise trade in early 2020 was 
70 per cent below where it would have been had the 
1990–2008 trend continued.1 Global cross-border 
lending by banks is now about 36 per cent of world 
GDP, compared with 55 per cent before 2008.2 Global 
foreign direct investment amounted to barely 1.5 
per cent of world GDP in 2019, below even the 2008 
slump to two per cent3. Indeed, the so-called Sino-
US trade war and rising protectionism around the 
world have undermined world trade. And now, in the 
wake of the pandemic, supply chains—the plumbing 
of globalisation—are increasingly in the cross-hairs, 
with governments and companies reconsidering 
the complexities of such chains. Several countries, 
including for example, Japan, often citing national 
security, are now trying to lure companies out of China 
to produce certain goods either at or closer to home. 
Beijing, meanwhile, wants to keep manufacturing, 
technology, telecommunications, and financing 
supply chains intact and rooted in China, also in the 
name of national security.
Although these developments are worrying, lacking 
leadership has been the most disconcerting 
occurrence of the last few years. The United States 
under President Trump has abandoned the global 
leadership role it is uniquely equipped to perform, 
while China, keen to be seen as a new leader, lacks 
the ability to be one.
President Xi Jinping made the case for Chinese 
leadership to the acclaim of the world’s elite in Davos 
in 2017, and again the following year at the Boao 
Forum, its own Davos on the island of Hainan. And yet, 
China can be 
expected to further 
emphasise ‘self-
reliance’—at least 
to the point of 
aiming for higher 
level of scientific 
and technological 
autonomy, reduced 
energy dependence, 
and a tilt away 
from exports to 
domestic production.
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despite rhetoric pleasing to the global elite, 
what Chinese globalisation means diverges 
from the term’s traditional meaning. 
China has unquestionably been the major 
beneficiary of the world’s open trading 
system: its firms have been active in global 
mergers and acquisitions while banks, now 
the world’s biggest in terms of assets, have 
funded infrastructure throughout Beijing’s 
expansive Belt and Road Initiative. But for 
China, globalisation remains a Western 
construct. A more assertive China hopes to 
redefine the term to meet its own goals, such 
as pursuing ‘self-reliance’ in key sectors. 
This entails policies and goals that, in many 
respects, are the antithesis of globalisation. 
The state of Xi’s China 
China is self-evidently a socialist state, but 
more to the point, a Leninist state. Although 
it has sought engagement with the West 
and global system in order to ‘catch up’ 
economically, build interdependence, and 
improve the well-being of its citizens, Beijing 
has always emphasised the centrality of 
the Communist Party and state’s role. 
This is essential: The party takes credit 
for the past, present, and future success 
of the country, and is fundamental to 
economic management and the role of 
state enterprises. Under Xi, this emphasis 
has become particularly pronounced. 
The current economic and operational 
management conditions facing private, 
including foreign, firms—the backbone 
of employment and imported know-how 
respectively—are now more unfavourable 
than they had been in decades.  
This strategy of indigenous innovation, 
adopted in 2006 to favour the development 
of domestically innovation and technology, 
frequently incurred criticism from foreign 
companies claiming discrimination. These 
firms took issue particularly with competition 
policy, procurement, fiscal incentives, credit 
terms, forced technology transfer, and 
intellectual property theft and piracy.
And yet, in spite of recent proposals to 
strengthen intellectual property law and 
lift ownership caps in some sectors, China 
enshrined this strategy with 2015’s ‘Made 
in China 2025’ initiative, which is designed 
to create national champions with at least 
70 per cent self-sufficiency in 10 advanced 
technologies. After the trade war began in 
2018, the government stopped referring to 
this strategy by name, but there is no question 
that it remains a government priority. Beijing 
has supplemented the initiative with other 
ambitious leadership objectives in artificial 
intelligence. Furthermore, the vulnerability 
of Chinese technology firms such as Huawei 
and ZTE to US and other restrictions has 
persuaded Beijing to try and reduce China’s 
dependence on imported semiconductors, 
the bill for which now surpasses that for 
crude oil. Before the National People’s 
Congress in 2020, the Chinese government 
also announced a ‘guideline to improve the 
socialist market economy in a new era’. 
Details of the guideline are sparse but may 
be spelled out in the 14th Five Year Plan 
later this year. 
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Governance matters
The party’s economic, industrial, and 
foreign policy agendas have attracted 
much criticism from Chinese scholars and 
intellectuals, which angers China’s leaders 
with little further effect. Such criticism has, 
however, become both more trenchant and 
frequent amid the trade war and pandemic. 
Some writers have called into question the 
legitimacy of the government’s narrative 
that China’s success is attributable to the 
Communist Party’s state and top-down 
industrial policy, and argued instead that 
the real reasons lie in attitudes and policies 
towards enterprise, markets, learning from 
other nations, and good governance. With 
the government turning away from these, 
China treading down a dangerous path at 
home and vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
This reminds us that there remains a 
spectrum of opinion in China about 
interdependence—and that the choice of 
where it places itself will have a significant 
bearing for us all.
Some doubtlessly see the benefits of 
continued interdependence in the form 
of higher economic growth, diffusion of 
technology, acquisition of know-how, and, 
as a result, leverage. Yet, these proponents 
may be on the political back foot this time. 
Others currently in ascendance recognise 
these benefits but also fret about China’s 
vulnerability to and dependency on the 
United States and other nations, especially 
in relation to advanced technologies and 
key components such as semiconductors. 
The so-called trade war has demonstrated 
both of these fears, underlining Xi’s 
preoccupation with national security. 
Accordingly, China can be expected to 
further emphasise ‘self-reliance’—at least 
to the point of aiming for higher level of 
scientific and technological autonomy, 
reduced energy dependence, and a tilt away 
from exports to domestic production.
This simple repositioning on the inter-
dependence spectrum comes with a 
twist: China’s discomfort with a globalised 
system that still functions according 
to a fundamentally American and 
Western design. 
What China wants is a globalisation with 
Chinese characteristics, a system in which 
Chinese governance standards become 
more common and eventually prevail. In 
other words, Xi’s China does not want 
to upend the global governance system 
and start over, but wants nevertheless 
to reshape it according to China’s own 
norms and standards regarding advanced 
technologies, internet and surveillance 
systems, human rights, laws and regulations, 
political practices, and governance. 
The rest of the world needs to take note, not 
because China is destined to succeed—it 
may well not, or succeed only partially—but 
because everyone will be affected by China’s 
expectation that countries should back its 
pitch for governance and regulations, which 
comes laden with Beijing’s expectations of 
control and stability, rather than the widely-
accepted rules of competition and business. 
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What is to be done?
There is no question that the United States will 
play a key part in framing these outcomes, but the 
upcoming elections will likely determine how. Until 
recently, American global hegemony depended 
on setting the agenda, winning supporters, and 
collectively implementing US efforts (although there 
were undoubtedly times when the US did not hold 
back from unilateral actions).
The contrast with the Chinese Communist Party could 
not be starker. The pandemic reminds us that Xi’s 
China sees virtue in a strongly authoritarian system. 
In the past, Beijing has punished countries that do 
not support its narrative and policies. Indeed, China 
certainly does not have the same kind of alliance 
ethos, or penchant for the tolerance of dissent, as the 
United States. 
When Xi refers to globalisation, he is certainly 
thinking, like all of us, about economic integration of 
the global system. But for him, globalisation is part 
of what he calls a ‘Community with a Shared Future 
for Humanity’ in which Chinese standards and norms 
hold sway. This governance model, which derives 
from historical and ideological analysis centred 
on Party’s ideas and decisions, is no more likely to 
encourage diversity and debate in the wider world 
than it does at home. 
In the wake of the pandemic, many countries sense a 
profound, almost personal, discomfort with aspects 
of China’s authoritarian system, including the lack of 
transparency and openness, and a stronger deference 
to political control and stability than to individual 
initiative and public debate. These aspects are, in 
fact, features of the Chinese system that produced 
serial misjudgements and failures in areas as diverse 
as food and public safety, financial and economic 
stability, foreign policy, and public health. 
What China wants 
is a globalisation 
with Chinese 
characteristics, a 
system in which 
Chinese governance 
standards become 
more common and 
eventually prevail.
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Furthermore, in spite of the fanfare and rhetoric centred 
on self-reliance, China’s relative position vis-à-vis the 
United States is not likely to improve much, if at all, in 
reference to issues like energy independence, high-
end semiconductors, educational attainment, high-end 
innovative science and engineering, financial leverage 
and even water availability. Simply sustaining economic 
growth and employment creation is more than enough 
of a challenge in the coming decade. 
Amid all the rhetoric about decoupling, and self-reliance, 
China’s ambition may in the end be largely unrealisable 
given the costs of hardship at home and disruption 
abroad. Many of the bonds of interdependence may 
prove difficult to rupture, absent overt conflict. We 
must hope that those seeking new, if different, forms 
of engagement prevail; regardless, there is little doubt 
that horns have locked in battle for global governance. 
To fight it, we need to better understand the Chinese 
Communist Party’s goals, features, and flaws.  
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Globalisation has faltered, and faces significant 
political challenges. In both the US and China, 
voices are calling for a reduction of economic 
interdependence between the two countries. In 
the US, this has taken the name of decoupling, 
in China, self-reliance. At the same time, China’s 
President, Xi Jinping has vocally championed 
globalisation in various global fora in recent years. 
Understanding of China’s systems of government 
and business, as well as its global interests, is 
lacking when compared to that of the US. In this 
Strategic Update, George Magnus investigates 
what is meant when China’s leadership speaks 
of globalisation, and what the implications of 
the answer are for the rest of the world.
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